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ABSTRACT  
   
Categories are often defined by rules regarding their features. These rules may be 
intensely complex yet, despite the complexity of these rules, we are often able to learn 
them with sufficient practice. A possible explanation for how we arrive at consistent 
category judgments despite these difficulties would be that we may define these complex 
categories such as chairs, tables, or stairs by understanding the simpler rules defined by 
potential interactions with these objects. This concept, called grounding, allows for the 
learning and transfer of complex categorization rules if said rules are capable of being 
expressed in a more simple fashion by virtue of meaningful physical interactions. The 
present experiment tested this hypothesis by having participants engage in either a Rule 
Based (RB) or Information Integration (II) categorization task with instructions to engage 
with the stimuli in either a non-interactive or interactive fashion. If participants were 
capable of grounding the categories, which were defined in the II task with a complex 
visual rule, to a simpler interactive rule, then participants with interactive instructions 
should outperform participants with non-interactive instructions. Results indicated that 
physical interaction with stimuli had a marginally beneficial effect on category learning, 
but this effect seemed most prevalent in participants were engaged in an II task.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For any given agent, learning can be broken down into several essential parts: the 
perception of a stimulus, a response, and feedback to that response. When a student 
taking a test provides an incorrect answer to a question, they are given a grade reflecting 
their correct and incorrect responses thus providing feedback on how well the student 
understands the topic. When a child reaches up to touch a stove, a parent may grab their 
hand, or perhaps the child experiences pain when he burns his hand, teaching the child 
the dangers of the stovetop. A child sees a dog bearing its teeth and shaking its tail and it 
only takes a single bite for the child to learn that a dog shaking its tail is not always 
friendly. The environments in which we find ourselves are defined by many dimensions 
which can vary greatly and the rules which determine a correct response to these stimuli 
and environments are not always simple. Actions with this environment often result in 
feedback which may be delayed, ambiguous, or even completely absent. The challenge, 
then, is to explain how we are capable of learning given such a difficult scenario. 
Traditional Categorization: Simple and Complex Rules 
To better understand how we learn “complex” rules, we must also understand 
how we learn “simple” rules. One of the dominant methods of studying such 
categorization behavior utilizes two similar yet distinct tasks (Ashby & Gott, 1988). 
These tasks use stimuli, usually defined by only a few dimensions, which can be 
separated into different categories by some dimensional rule. When the rule is 
unidimensional (e.g., if stimulus has dimension X > 5 then it belong in category A) it is 
called a Rule Based (RB) task. When the rule is multidimensional (e.g., if stimulus has 
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dimension X > dimension Y then it belongs in category B) it is called an Information 
Integration (II) task. The tasks, while sharing similar cognitive processes such as 
attention and memory, have different constraints. Namely, the RB task requires only that 
participants understand one aspect of the stimulus while the II task requires that 
participants understand a relationship between two dimensions so that a stimulus may be 
correctly categorized. 
 As should be expected, Rule Based and Information Integration tasks differ over 
more than their dimensional definitions. Ashby, Queller, & Berretty (1999) had 
participants engage in either the RB or II task. Some participants were provided feedback 
on their categorization responses while others were not. Participants in the RB task were 
able to learn to correctly categorize stimuli regardless of whether they received feedback 
or not, while participants in the II task were only able to learn the multidimensional 
boundary when feedback was provided.  They concluded that, in the absence of feedback, 
individuals will attempt to use the simplest possible rule and it should be noted that these 
effects are limited to situations in which only two category assignments are possible. A 
later study by Maddox, Ashby, and Bohil (2003) had participants engage in either RB or 
II tasks and participants were provided with either immediate feedback for their decisions 
or feedback that was delayed by 2.5, 5, or 10 seconds. While their results showed that 
participants made more accurate category judgments in the RB task over the II task, they 
also showed that participants engaged in the RB task were not affected by the delay in 
feedback. In contrast, participants in the II task found their performance significantly 
hindered by the delay in feedback.  
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Maddox, Ashby, and Bohil (2003) argued that the reason for these differential 
effects of feedback presentation on category learning between II and RB tasks was due to 
different underlying neurological mechanisms being utilized by each task. Specifically, 
they hypothesized that Rule Based learning depends upon executive attention and explicit 
hypothesis testing, a process which depends heavily on the prefrontal cortex, while 
information integration relies on an implicit procedural learning system which relies upon 
a dopamine reward based in the caudate nucleus. As such, the impairing effects of 
delayed feedback on learning in an II task are explained by the denying or delaying the 
essential neurological reward signal generated by feedback.  
Overcoming Complexity Naturally 
This dependency upon feedback for learning to occur in an II task has the 
significant implication that learning complex categories likely requires both reliable and 
immediate feedback. Yet, we are likely to have experiences with objects and 
environments which may not always occur within the presence of an informed and 
responsive teacher, and naturally occurring feedback may not always be reliable or 
immediate. Despite these difficulties, there is evidence that we are capable of learning 
complex rules. Mervis and Rosch (1978) thought of humans (and other organisms) as 
learning agents within a massively complex environment which struggle to gain the 
maximum amount of meaningful information from their environment while utilizing the 
least amount of cognitive effort. An essential part of this argument arose from Rosch et 
al. (1976), which gave evidence of “basic level” categories; categories which are more 
easily distinguished from one another because they differ along (comparatively) easily 
perceivable dimensions and because the rules which designate these categories are related 
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to information meaningful to the individual. For instance, while a dog and a cat have 
many features in common (in comparison to, say, a bird), an observer with minimal 
experience is unlikely to confuse one for the other. However, an observer with minimal 
experience may have a hard time distinguishing between different breeds of dogs because 
the rules which distinguish the different breeds are either difficult to perceive and/or 
because little meaningful information is gained from the capacity to distinguish between 
them.  
This theory of basic categories has accurately predicted that participants would 
categorize objects at the basic level faster than they would for super- or sub-ordinate 
levels of categorization (Murphy & Smith, 1982). For example, shown an image of a 
Golden Retriever, most individuals would identify the image as a “dog” rather than the 
sub-ordinate level category, “Golden Retriever”, or superordinate level category, 
“mammal” or “animal”. However, this tendency for basic level categories to be the 
primary level of categorization does not mean that other levels of categorization are 
inaccessible. Tanaka & Taylor (1991) had dog and bird experts engage in a series of 
tasks. First, experts and novices listed features for various categories of differing levels: 
subordinate, basic, and superordinate. Experts listed as many distinguishing, or unique, 
features for subordinate categories (breeds of dogs or species of birds) as they did for 
basic level categories; experts perceived subordinate categories to be just as distinct from 
one another as basic level categories. In a second experiment, experts and novices were 
shown images of various dogs and birds and asked to identify them as quickly as 
possible. Experts were significantly more likely than novices to respond with the 
subordinate category level responses (i.e., calling an image of a Golden Retriever a 
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Golden Retriever rather than just a dog). Lastly, when shown images of birds and dogs 
presented with a correct or false subordinate, basic level, or superordinate label, experts 
responded just as quickly to subordinate level labels as basic level labels. These findings 
imply that, the basic level of categorization is established by not only the dimensions of 
the stimuli perceived, but also the meaningful feedback we receive from the environment. 
As such, complex categories are not beyond understanding, given enough relevant 
interaction. 
The finding of a basic level of categorization, a series of complex yet accessible 
and learnable rules, potentially poses a challenge to the findings of Ashby, Queller, and 
Berretty (1999) and Maddox, Ashby, and Bohil (2003) which, as previously stated, claim 
that complex rules are not learnable without feedback and are difficult to learn when 
feedback is interrupted or unreliable. There must be an underlying phenomenon by which 
basic level categories are easily learned without the use of an instructor; wherein 
feedback is provided by the environment itself by virtue of the individual’s experience 
interacting with the environment. Such an example is provided by Warren (1984) who 
showed participants of varying heights projected images of stairs. The participants then 
responded if they believed the stairs were “climbable”. As perceived stair height 
increased, shorter participants would eventually respond that the stairs were no longer 
climbable. Of note, there was a direct relationship between the probability that a 
participant would respond that a set of stairs were climbable and the ratio of the height of 
the stair to the length of the participant’s leg. Warren concluded that such perceptual  
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categories exist as a function of the relationship of the agent and the environment, and are 
not simply due to the dimensions of the environment itself. Furthermore, these interactive 
categories were immediately perceivable to participants, due to the extent of experience 
they had interacting with stair-like objects. 
 This concept of immediately available information was extolled by Gibson (1966) 
who theorized that a perceptual system is constrained not only by the information which 
can be sensed in the environment but also by how the observer may act upon such 
information. These constraints allow for “direct perception” of meaningful information 
regarding the environment; the immediate perception of information within the 
environment which is useful to the agent. As an example, the slope of a terrain is 
considered to provide immediate information to the perceiver of whether it is traversable 
not only by virtue of the slope of the terrain but also by what the agent understands about 
its own ability to maneuver through space and along different slopes. These directly 
perceived possible interactions of the agent with the environment are called “affordances” 
(Gibson, 1986; Turvey, 1992) and are considered invariant: so long as the agent maintains 
its capacities to both act and to perceive and the environment continues to maintain its 
status (e.g. slope and firmness of terrain) the affordances of that environment do not 
change. 
 While these examples are related to physically interactive situations, affordances 
and invariants can also be expressed within the context of limited interactivity. Shepard 
(1984) tried to address the issue of mental rotation and motion ambiguity; two 
phenomenon which show that the individuals are capable of manipulating information 
and images internally. In order to explain these phenomena, Shepard proposed the 
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concept of resonance, which allows for completely external events, partially external 
events, and even internally imagined events to be biased by the same constraints of the 
perceived (or imagined) environment and capabilities of the agent. For example, 
McBeath, Schiano, and Tversky (1997) showed participants symmetric and asymmetric 
polygons and asked participants to describe them. Participants were more likely to 
perceive symmetric objects as silhouettes of 3D objects which were being viewed head 
on, while asymmetric shapes were perceived as being profile or oblique views of similar 
3D objects. According to the idea of resonance, these images resonated with the real 
world invariant that objects tend to be symmetrical about their axis of forward motion. 
Therefore, symmetric objects are perceived as facing the observer while asymmetric 
objects are perceived as not facing the observer because the supposed axis of symmetry is 
directed away from the observer. 
 This concept of resonance, that our perception of abstractions is still influenced 
by our capacity for physical interactivity, is strikingly similar to the grounding principle 
(Clark & Brennan, 1991) which assumes that even abstract concepts are based upon, not 
only the differences in perceived or imagined features, but also by individual’s ability to 
interact with the perceptions. To illustrate, Anderson (2003) gave the example of a tree 
stump being referred to as a “chair”. Despite the fact that a tree stump has very little in 
common with most encountered chairs, an observer would understand the reference 
because the tree stump affords the observer the possibility of sitting just as a chair would. 
In other words, the abstract concept of “chair” is given meaning, not by just the physical 
dimensions of a given stimulus, but the capacity that an agent has to interact with it.   
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The grounding principle also implies that any new thing, despite its possible physical 
dimensions, may be defined as a chair so long as it affords the agent the same sitting 
capacity of previously experienced chairs. 
These claims are supported by research which indicates that, when participants 
are dealing with objects with which they have a history of interaction, the visual 
inspection of the objects also activates the motor capacities involved with interacting with 
that object (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Glenberg, Robertson, Kashak, & Malter, 2003). 
These pieces of evidence suggest that our capacities to learn concepts and to generalize 
from experiences onto new stimuli are constrained not only by the features of the 
environment, but are also related to our capacity to interact with the environment. This 
benefit of interactivity should render individuals capable of understanding complex 
categories defined by both physical and abstract stimuli so long as the interactive 
relationship between the participant and the stimulus is made clear (Anderson, 2003; 
Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Goldstone & Wilensky, 2008).  
The Shared Neurology of Perception and Motor Control 
The impact of interactivity on categorization is not limited to purely cognitive 
factors. There are also neurological aspects involved. Faillenot et al. (1997) utilized a 
variety of neuroimaging techniques to detect differences in neural activation patterns in 
both a visual recognition task (identifying when two objects were the same) and a motor 
task (grasping and moving one object at a time). These tasks were not done in any 
particular order. The researchers found that the intraparietal sulcus was activated for both 
the visual perception and the interaction with those objects. Jeannerod (2001) 
hypothesized that there was a motor simulation neural network within the brain that is 
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activated, not only as part of perception and action, but also in regards to imagined 
actions. Supporting evidence for such a system can be found in work by Frak, Paulignan, 
and Jeannerod (2001) who found that, when an individual estimates the feasibility of 
grasping an object, reaction time increases as the object is rotated further away from an 
ideal interaction, similar to a mental rotation (Shepard, 1978; 1984). 
This linking of action to cognition is not limited to simple object interaction tasks. 
Indeed, there is a body of evidence suggesting that both real and imagined action and 
other cognitive tasks, such as categorization, share neurological systems. Buccino and 
colleagues (2005) utilized Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to stimulate “hand” 
or “leg” areas of the motor cortex while participants listened to sentences containing 
actions utilizing hands or legs. They found that muscles within participants’ hands and 
legs were activated when listening to hand and leg action related sentences, respectively. 
Furthermore, these responses were altered with the application of TMS to the specific 
motor areas of the brain while the sentence was being heard. These findings were 
expanded by Glenberg and colleagues (2008) who found motor activation and subsequent 
effects of TMS on motor activation during the comprehension of sentences with abstract 
actions (e.g. delegating tasks or issuing orders) as well as concrete actions. These 
findings indicate an intimate functional relationship between motor action and language 
processing. 
While TMS offers the opportunity to alter brain function temporarily, the 
relationship between motor activation and sentence comprehension has been investigated 
in individuals with permanent damage to motor areas. Parkinson’s disease, damages 
dopamine receptors and destroys them over time resulting in a gradual loss of motor 
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control. Boulenger and colleagues (2008) found that individuals with Parkinson’s disease, 
when off of their dopaminergic medication, have more difficulty understanding action 
related words but their medication status does not affect their understanding of concrete 
nouns. Further interactions between motor functions, action related neurotransmitters, 
and the brain’s activation patterns and the comprehension of words are well established 
(see Mahon & Caramazza, 2008 for a summary). These findings indicate a strong link 
between actual and imagined motor control and cognitive capacities of the individual to 
process interactive stimuli. 
This detrimental effect of damage to dopaminergic systems is not limited to 
interactions and interactive concepts. Parkinson’s disease patients have been shown to 
perform comparably with normal participants when engaged in artificial grammar 
learning and in distinguishing category members from non-category stimuli (Reber & 
Squire, 1999), implying that damage to dopaminergic areas of the brain has little impact 
on perceptual learning tasks, such as information integration. However, Maddox and 
Filoteo (2001) compared Parkinson’s patients to control participants in their capacity to 
learn RB and II tasks. They found that Parkinson’s patients were just as likely to fail to 
learn in a RB task as controls, but were more likely to fail to learn in an II task than 
similarly aged controls. Maddox and Filoteo concluded that, although the basal ganglia 
(and its dopaminergic functions) are implicated in both RB and II task performance, 
different areas are utilized for each task; success in RB tasks depends upon the prefrontal 
cortex and the head of the caudate nucleus, while success in II tasks depends more upon 
the tail of the caudate nucleus (Ashby & Waldron, 1999). These findings imply that the 
learning of artificial grammar, RB, and II tasks all require unique neural pathways, 
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despite their sharing multiple neural modules. Furthermore, the impact of Parkinson’s 
disease on both motor control and category learning indicates that areas of the brain 
associated with motor control are also involved in the learning of category structures 
which, in turn, implies that these functions may be related. 
 The nature of this interaction between sensory motor regions in the brain and 
verbal cognition has been the cause of some debate as there have been several prominent 
theories which purport to explain these effects. The most radical of these theories, aptly 
identified as the embodied cognition hypothesis (ECH) (Glenberg, 1997), stipulates that 
all conceptual knowledge is inseparable from the motor and sensory systems of the 
individual; all memory and cognitive capacities of the individual are defined and 
constrained by their physical capacities to sense and interact with the environment. The 
weakness of this theory lies in its explanation of how we come to have and consistently 
utilize abstract concepts such as justice, beauty, or patience. Such concepts often do not 
rely on a single set of experiences actions: these concepts may be applied to a diversity of 
individuals, actions, or environments, yet the same concept is employed to encapsulate 
them. It should be noted that the presence of abstract concepts within individuals is 
nothing new in categorization literature (Posner & Keele, 1968; Minda & Smith, 2001; 
Homa, Hout, Milliken, & Milliken, 2011) and there is some evidence that the occurrence 
of such abstractions can arise from a cognitive system which stores such a vast array of 
individual experiences as unique exemplars (Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002; Zaki, Nosofsky, 
Stanton, & Cohen, 2003). However, the occurrence of abstract knowledge is still 
somewhat problematic to theories which stipulate a cognitive system which is rigidly 
constrained to interactivity. 
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 To account for such abstract knowledge, two other theories have been posited 
which stipulate the existence of “disembodied” concepts within the cognitive system: that 
certain concepts cannot be reliably and directly understood or generated by motor 
activation alone (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). The antithesis of the ECH is the 
disembodied cognition hypothesis (DCH) which stipulates that the relationship between 
motor activation and conceptual understanding is simple conditioning; concepts exist as 
abstract knowledge and the activation of the motor response system is a byproduct rather 
than a cause of the activation of that abstract knowledge. DCH, while explaining the 
finding that motor and sensory areas of the brain are activated during cognition (Hauk et 
al. 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005), fails to acknowledge the previously discussed impact of 
motor and sensory capacity on word recognition (see also Neininger & P Pulvermüller, 
2003) or sentence comprehension (see also Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). In essence, there 
is sufficient evidence to conclude that sensation and motor capacity are involved in 
concept formation and utilization, particularly when such concepts are active (e.g., 
hammer, kicking, chair). However, the embodied cognition hypothesis stipulates that 
concept use it constrained to specific instances and actions (Glenberg & Gallese, 2012) 
and therefore has difficulty explaining more abstract concepts such as justice or beauty 
which can be applied to multiple unique contexts. 
 Mahon and Caramazza (2008), in an attempt to explain all of these aspects of 
concept formation and utilization stipulated the Domain-Specific Sensory-Motor (DSSM) 
hypothesis which argues for the presence of abstract categorical knowledge which is 
grounded within, but not limited to, physical sensation and interaction.  To explain this, 
they provide the following example regarding the concept “beautiful”: 
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Consider the concept BEAUTIFUL. There is no consistent sensory or motor information 
that corresponds to the concept BEAUTIFUL. The diversity of sensory and motor 
information that may be instrumental in the instantiation of the concept BEAUTIFUL is 
unlimited: the mountains can be beautiful, or an idea, or the face of the beloved. The 
‘abstract’ and ‘symbolic’ representation BEAUTIFUL is given specificity by the sensory 
and/or motor information with which it interacts in a particular instantiation. Of course, 
this claim could be interpreted as indicating that anything that ‘happens’ to be activated 
in the mind/brain when a given concept is instantiated is ‘part of’ that concept. In this 
regard, the analogy to spreading activation during lexical access in speech production is 
relevant. So for instance, when a person says to another – you are beautiful – the 
activation of the phonological encoding system is not, in any sense, 
‘part’ of the concept BEAUTIFUL. On the other hand, one may be inclined to say that 
the perception of the setting sun behind the beloved, is in a relevant sense, part of the 
instantiation of the concept BEAUTIFUL in the utterance – you are beautiful. 
This example illustrates that, in the using of the concept of “beautiful” the individual 
accesses an abstraction which has been generated from a summed experience with other 
sensations which are also instances of “beautiful”, even if those specific sensations are 
not direct facsimiles of the current experience. If applied to more “interactive” concepts, 
such as “hammer”, the concept is grounded to specific instances of hammer interaction 
but the concept is abstract in that the instances need not be identical. Indeed, they can be 
extremely diverse; even a brick can be conceived of as a hammer just as a tree stump can 
be conceived of as a chair (Anderson, 2003). 
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If concepts are indeed grounded to our interactions and perceptions, then stimulus 
interactivity presents an opportunity to affect, and perhaps improve, category learning. If 
a visual stimulus is grounded to an interactive concept, such as weights which are 
separated into “heavy” and “light”, then the presentation of a stimulus activates not only 
the visual but also motor areas of the brain associated with that stimulus (Martin, 2007). 
Indeed, the possibility that new concepts may be easier to learn if grounded in previously 
learned concepts was predicted by Seger and Miller (2010) who argued that, because 
brain activity involved in executive functions, motor capacities, and vision have a shared 
neurological workspace (basal ganglia), it is possible that activation of motor loops may 
facilitate in the learning process, even if those activations are the result of a resonance 
from imagined interactions.  
Putting the Pieces Together 
As has been shown, there is ample evidence to predict that there is an effect of 
stimulus interactivity with category learning and categorization behavior. First and most 
likely, there is good reason to believe that interaction may aide in participants’ learning in 
an II task. While II tasks typically involve the difficult process of combining sensory 
information from two dimensions, interactivity offers a potential method to circumvent 
this difficulty, given the proper context. In essence, when the rule separating categories in 
an II task can be expressed as a simple, unidimensional, interactive rule such as when 
stairs, a complex visual rule, can be expressed as a unidimensional interactive rule such 
as stairs being “climbable” or “non-climbable” (Warren, 1984) or a ball being catchable  
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or not catchable (McBeath, Shaffer, & Kaiser, 1995; Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker, & 
Dolne, 1996). This effect should occur even when interaction is only imagined (Frak et 
al., 2001). 
Second, there is evidence that physical interaction may engage neurological 
systems upon which both RB and II task performance depend. This shared neurological 
workspace could imply that information from one system could be informative and 
instructive to the other. If so, it would be fairly reasonable to expect that physical 
interaction with stimuli should improve accuracy in both tasks. However, RB task 
performance is usually not difficult for participants (Ashby, Noble, Filoteo, Waldron, & 
Ell, 2003). Therefore, both participant learning and end categorization performance 
should be unlikely to improve as participant performance should begin at nearly peak 
levels. Also, the presence of additional, irrelevant information such as a co-occurring task 
has been shown to impair learning during a RB task (Waldron & Ashby, 2001) and, 
therefore, the presence of additional, non-diagnostic information gained from interaction 
may actually impede learning. As such, the inclusion of a task irrelevant interactivity may 
harm performance during the RB task, potentially even to the point of impairing learning.  
The current experiment was structured to test if the grounding principle is 
applicable in category learning and, if so, when and to what extent. In opposition to this 
principle are the disembodied theories of category learning: that experience and stimulus 
dimensional values are all that determine accuracy in categorization and, furthermore, 
that the potential interactivity of a participant with the stimuli has no impact on their 
capacity to grasp conceptual structure. Participants engaged in a Rule Based task or an 
Information Integration task and were given one of four different instructions: (1) 
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visually inspect these stimuli and then identify them as members of category A or 
category B, (2) visually inspect these stimuli and then identify them as one of two types 
of children’s toy (Type A or Type B), (3) visually inspect these stimuli and then imagine 
interacting with these objects and then identify them as members of category A or B, or 
(4) visually inspect these stimuli and then physically interact with the object and then 
identify them as members of category A or B. If embodied cognition is capable of 
impacting category learning, we should predict that, if participants can ground 
dimensionally complex categorization rules into simpler, interactive terms they should, 
therefore, be able to learn to categorize stimuli into those categories easier than 
participants who lack such grounding. On the other hand, traditional, non-embodied 
explanations of category learning would predict that interactivity would not alter the 
learning in the II task. Given the previously discussed difficulties in predicting the effects 
of interactivity on RB task performance, it was unclear if any benefit of interactivity was 
capable of overcoming the difficulty of additional, non-diagnostic information. As such, 
it was predicted that there would be no effect of interactivity on performance in a RB 
task. 
 To make specific hypotheses, it was predicted (1) that participant accuracy would 
increase across blocks and (2) participants engaged in the RB task would reduce the 
number of errors made within a block faster than participants engaged in the II task. 
Furthermore, if category grounding though embodied cognition aides in the learning of 
complex categories, but not simple categories, then there should be a significant 
interaction between block number, instruction group, and categorization task. Follow up 
model analysis comparisons will compare models which either treat responses from 
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participants in different instruction groups as responses from unique populations to 
models which treat all participants’ responses the same. If category grounding aides in 
the learning of complex categories, then models which treat participant responses from 
interactive instructions as separate from participant responses from non-interactive 
instruction groups should fit the data better than models which treat those groups as the 
same. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS 
Participants 
 Participants were 280 ASU undergraduate students sampled from the Psychology 
101 student pool. These participants signed up for the study through the SONA system 
run through the ASU website. Participants were granted ½ credit hours of their 
participation. These credit hours are needed for the participants to receive a grade for 
their class. 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli were 20 wooden blocks each with a handle that was ½ in. x ½ in. x 1 in. 
These stimuli varied in length from 2 to 11 inches and in width from 1 to 4 inches. The 
stimulus dimensions are shown in Figure 1 and images of the actual stimuli are shown in 
Figures 2a and 2b.  
Category Structure 
 Category structure, as experienced by participants, was determined by the 
feedback they were provided. In the II task, the rule to distinguish between the two 
categories was (as shown in Figure 1) multidimensional. For this task, stimuli for 
which 𝐿𝐿 > 9 −𝑊𝑊  (in inches) are members of category A, and stimuli for which L < 9 – 
W (in inches) are members of category B. In the RB task stimuli with width greater than 
2.5 in. were members of group A and stimuli with width less than 2.5 in. were members 
of group B. 
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Information Integration Category Structure 
 
Rule Based Category Structure 
 
Figure 1. Stimulus Dimensions and Category Membership 
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 Figure 2a. Stimulus Example as viewed by participants 
 
Figure 2b. Entire Stimulus Set 
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 Figure 3a. II Category Structure by Rotational Inertia 
 
Figure 3b. RB Category Structure by Rotational Inertia 
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defined by width and rotational inertia where rotational inertia was roughly estimated 
such that a cubic inch of material at one inch distance from handle would equal one unit 
of torque.  
Procedure 
 Instructions 
 Participants were first instructed that they will be learning to sort objects into two 
categories. They were then given one of four different instructions: (1) some were simply 
told that the stimuli belong to two different categories and they should look at the stimuli 
and then make their choice, (2) some were told the objects were simplistic children’s toys 
but were instructed only to look at the stimuli, (3) some were told to imagine holding the 
stimuli by their "handles" and to imagine moving them around, while the object remained 
on the table, and (4) some were told to actually hold the stimuli by the "handles", pick 
them up, and manipulate them freely. The exact instructions may be found in Appendix 
A. 
 Learning 
 Participants went through 6 blocks of 20 trials each. On each trial, a stimulus, 
selected randomly without replacement, would be placed on the table in front of the 
participant. They would then obey their instructions (see above) and make a category 
assignment. They were immediately provided feedback on their judgments and the next 
trial would begin. Between each block, participants were given a brief reminder of their 
instructions. 
Backwards Learning Curve 
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 Concerns regarding aggregate data have been a constant concern in cognitive 
psychology, including in Multidimensional scaling of similarity data (Ashby, Maddox, & 
Lee, 1994) and even categorization behavior (Maddox, 1999;). The basic concern within 
these writings, particularly within categorization literature, is that this averaging process 
leads to an incorrect understanding of the behaviors of individuals. In order to investigate 
the effects that the instructions would have on individual behavior, rather than aggregate 
behavior of their groups, individual participant data was analyzed with an exploratory 
Backwards Curve analysis (Hayes, 1953; Estes, 1956).  
For this analysis, each participant was given a score dependent upon the block in 
which they made half or fewer errors than the previous block. It was assumed that, prior 
to any experience with the stimuli, the participants would perform at chance (10 errors). 
The outcome of this analysis would assign to each participant a value between 1-7 
defining the block in which that participant made a significant improvement in accuracy 
for their categorization judgments. To illustrate, a hypothetical participant, w, makes 4 
errors on block one. He is given a score of 1 because he has made 50% or fewer errors 
than the initial estimate of chance performance (10 errors). Another participant, x, makes 
a total of 8 errors on block one and then 4 on block two. X is given a score of 2, because 
he has made 50% or fewer errors on block two than in block one. Participant Y makes 10 
errors in block one, 12 in block two, then 6 in block three and is given a score of 3. 
However, participant Z makes 10 errors, then 9, 8, 7, 6, and finally 4. Despite having 
made fewer errors in each block than in the preceding block, he has never made a 
significant improvement, and is therefore given a score of 7. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Traditional Analyses 
 Instruction Groups 
Errors on blocks were subjected to a repeated measures analysis where block was 
treated as the repeated measure and participant instructions and category task were 
treated as between subject variables. As can be seen in Figures 4a and 4b, the results 
show participants made fewer errors across blocks (main effect of block), F(5, 268) = 
138.740, p < .001, η2 = .721 and participants made fewer errors in the RB task than in the 
II task, F(1, 272) = 112.153, p < .001, η2 = .292. These variables interacted, F(5, 268) = 
7.825, p < 0.01, η2 = .127, such that participants made fewer errors faster in the RB task 
than in the II task.  Lastly, the interaction between block and instructions was not 
significant F(5, 810) = 1.404, p = .138, η2 = .027, and the three way interaction between 
block, instructions, and task was also not significant, F(15, 810) = 1.217, p = .252, η2 = 
.025. All other effects and interactions were non-significant. 
Interaction Groups vs. Non-Interaction Groups  
Exploratory analyses were done in which the groups with “interactive” 
instructions (“Interact” and “Imagine”) were grouped together and the “non-interactive” 
instruction groups (“Kids Toys” and “A or B”) were grouped together. As can be seen in 
Figures 5a and 5b, the results show participants made fewer errors across blocks (main 
effect of block), F(5, 272) = 138.073, p < .001, η2 = .717 and participants made fewer 
errors in the RB task than in the II task, F(1, 199) = 52.520, p < .001, η2 = .290. 
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Figure 4b. Information Integration Task Errors for All Instruction Groups 
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These variables interacted, F(5, 272) = 7.913, p < 0.001, η2 = .127, such that participants 
made fewer errors faster in the RB task than in the II task.  Lastly, while the interaction 
between block and instructions was not significant F(5, 272) = 1.773, p = .119, η2 = .032, 
there was a significant three way interaction between block, instructions, and task, F(5, 
272) = 2.368, p = .040, η2 = .042. This interaction implies that participants’ improvement 
across blocks was significantly affected by interactive definitions in the II task, but not in 
the RB task. Again, referring to Figures 5a and 5b, this effect was not linear (implying 
that the difference in learning between interactive and non-interactive stimulus definition 
groups was not that one was simply more accurate than the other). Post-hoc contrast 
analyses confirm that this effect is not linear, F(1, 276) = .163, p = .687. All other effects 
and interactions were non-significant. 
Backwards Learning Curves: Instructions 
 A univariate ANOVA was run comparing the Backwards Learning Curve data 
between instruction groups. Participants engaged in the RB made significant 
improvements in  accuracy in earlier blocks (M=1.64)  than participants engaged in the II 
task (M=3.48), F(1, 272) = 76.900, p < .001, η2 = .220.While there was no significant 
difference between instruction groups alone, F(1, 272) = 1.713, p = .165, η2 = .019, there 
was a significant interaction between instruction group and category structure, F(3, 272) 
= 2.654, p = .049, η2 = .028. As can be seen in Figure 6a, participants engaged in the RB 
task did not vary highly as a result of instruction group, while instructions had a 
significant impact on participants engaged in the II task. 
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 Backwards Learning Curves: Interaction Groups 
 Just as with the learning data, another analysis was done comparing the 
Backwards Learning Curve data between Interactive groups with non-interactive groups 
(See Figure 6b). Just as before, participants engaged in the RB task made significant 
improvements in their accuracy earlier than participants engaged in the II task, F(1, 276) 
= 75.554, p < .001, η2 = .215. Participants with Interactive stimulus (M=2.36) made 
marginal improvements (not significantly) earlier in learning than participants with non-
interactive definitions (M=2.76), F(1, 276) = 3.560, p = .060, η2 = .013. There was no 
interaction between stimulus definition group and task, F(1, 276) = 0.549, p = .549, η2 = 
.002. 
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Figure 6a. Significant Improvement Block by Instruction Groups 
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Figure 6b. Significant Improvement Block by Interaction Groups 
Bayesian Model Comparisons 
 To further investigate these results, three different Bayesian models were 
measured for the degree to which they fit the results presented. All models are based 
around the same basic structure shown in Figure 7. In essence, the function of each model 
is to attempt to predict, given the parameters and their interactions with one another, the 
number of errors a sampled participant will make within each block. As such, the model 
has a number of interacting parameters. The simplest parameter, N, is the number of trials 
(and therefore possible errors) in a given block. This value is fixed at 20. The next 
parameters to consider are T1 through T6. These parameters are meant to imply the degree 
of accuracy of the participants sampled in blocks 1 and 6, respectively. These parameters 
are multiplied by the total number of possible errors, N, to predict the number of errors in  
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each block. As such, the greater the value of T, the more errors the model predicts that 
participants will make in that given block. T is not a fixed value, and is instead given a 
distribution of possible values; a beta distribution, bounded to be between 0 and 1 (100% 
accuracy and 0% accuracy respectively). Finally, this predicted number of errors is 
expected to vary, and so the predicted outcome from the interaction of N and T is given a 
precision of τ, or tau. This precision can be more easily understood if conceived of as 
variance, where the variance of the estimated number of errors is equal to 1/ τ. As such, 
the greater the value of τ, the more accurate the model assumes its predictions will be. 
Tau is given a gamma distribution, which is bounded between 0 and infinity, (which 
prevents the model from predicting negative variance) and assumes that lower values are 
more likely than higher values (assumes greater variance than less). In sum, the basic 
model attempts to predict the number of total errors on a given block of trials (Y) by 
integrating the other parameters of the model, N, T, and τ.  
 
Note. Priors, including the distributions utilized for each parameter are given in the appendix. 
Figure 7. Basic Bayesian Model 
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 As a reminder, the basic process of Bayesian inference takes these prior 
distributions of possible values for a given variable (in this instance T) and updates them 
depending upon the distribution of probable scores given the data. WINBUGS, the 
software used for this modeling, uses Gibbs sampling to construct this posterior 
distribution. In brief, this method assigns values to the variables being analyzed (for the 
AGSL this means T for block 1, T for block 2, etc.). The software then attempts to 
choose a new value for one of the variables, say T1, by (1) choosing a random new value 
for T1 and then (2) sampling from the data. If the new value for T1 or the current value of 
T1, combined with the values for the other variables, T2-T6, fits the sampled data better, 
the model updates T1 to the new value. If not, it keeps the old value. The software then 
attempts to update the next variable in the sequence, T2 using the same methods and the 
new, or old, value of T1. This continues on through each variable until all variables have 
been updated. One run through all variables is considered a single “sample”. After a large 
number of samples have been taken, what is left is a distribution of possible values for 
each variable and with the best fitting values being more likely to be sampled; thereby 
giving those parameter values the highest probability density with similar values also 
having high probability. 
The measure used to determine model fit is the Deviance Information Criterion 
(DIC). A model’s DIC is a measure of how well the variable values sampled from the 
distributions deviate from the data. The lower the DIC, the better the variables 
approximate the data. The DIC also incorporates a measure called ‘pD’ which increases a 
models DIC for each parameter added. This, in essence, penalizes models for adding 
extraneous parameters to account for variability. The procedure, then, is to have a 
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measure of DIC for each model such that the model with the lowest DIC is considered to 
be the best model fitting the data. 
The three models analyzed using these methods were different from one another 
not in the basic construction of the model, but in how many iterations of the model were 
utilized to fit to participant responses and how participants’ data were entered into those 
versions. The hypotheses of the present experiment questioned if interaction, even 
imagined interaction, would allow for participants to learn complex categories faster than 
participants who lacked any interactive insight. The first model is called the “All Groups 
Same Learning” (AGSL) model, and it assumes that there was no difference between 
participants learning over blocks as a result of instructions. It uses only the basic model 
and it lumps all participant responses for a given block into the same distributions 
regardless of their instruction group. The second model is called the “All Groups 
Different Learning” (AGDL) model. It stipulates four different iterations of the basic 
model for each instruction group. The third model is the “Interactive Groups Different 
Learning” (IGDL). It utilizes two iterations of the basic model which samples 
participants’ errors for a given block depending upon whether they were given interactive 
(“Interact” or “Imagine”) or non-interactive (“Kids Toys” or “A or B”) instructions. 
These three different models, their assumed distributions, and their priors are detailed in 
the appendix. 
Multiple Sampling Chains 
When generating each model, each parameter was given a random initial value. In 
order to prevent these initial values from biasing the final distributions, each model was 
given three different sets of initial parameters, or 3 “chains”. These chains were first run 
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through 10,000 samples after which it was assumed that they were no longer biased by 
their initial starting values. These 30,000 samples (total) were not included in any 
analyses. Then an additional 100,000 samples using these three chains (for 300,000 total) 
were run to generate the posterior distributions and to gain the measure of the DIC. 
Bayesian Modeling Results 
 As can be seen in Table 1, AGSL had the lowest DIC, followed by the IGDL and 
finally the AGDL for not only the RB task but also for the II task, regardless of whether 
or not the data contained only participants who reached the learning criterion. It should 
be noted that the IGDL model always fit the data better but the additional parameters of 
the IGDL model increase its DIC such that the AGSL was always considered to be the 
better model to describe the data gathered. 
Table 1. Model DIC 
II Task Data 
Model DBar pD DIC 
AGSL 4178.970 7.969 4186.940 
AGDL 4179.820 25.301 4205.120 
IGDL 4175.660 13.864 4189.530 
RB Task Data 
Model DBar pD DIC 
AGSL 3383.270 7.737 3391.010 
AGDL 3386.690 22.365 3409.050 
IGDL 3382.770 12.946 3395.720 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The present experiment was designed to determine if stimulus interactivity, 
imagined or otherwise, would aide in the learning of complex categories. While averaged 
accuracy of participants showed no significant beneficial effect of interactive instructions 
on learning, individual analysis of participants’ improvement across blocks revealed that 
participants with interactive instructions made significant gains in learning during earlier 
blocks than participants with non-interactive instructions. Furthermore, while the 
Bayesian model comparisons showed that the AGSL model was the best fitting model, 
the IGDL model was actually a better predictor of participant accuracy and is described 
as a less fitting model only due to the additional parameters of the model. These results 
seem to indicate a consistent, albeit minor, effect; that stimulus interactivity provided a 
small benefit to category learning. 
 By no means should one consider this study and its results a full-throated 
confirmation of this potential benefit. Rather, this claim should be considered with the 
understanding that this study was aimed at detecting the presence of an effect given the 
most basic of experimental constraints. The only real differences between the present 
experiment and other similar categorization experiments conducted with the same 
category structures (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988; Maddox, Ashby, & Bohil, 2003) was the 
nature of the instructions and the use of physical rather than computer generated stimuli.  
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Yet, these simple differences resulted in a non-trivial impact on participants’ 
categorization accuracy. It is, therefore, likely that there exist more impactful alterations 
to instructions and to the stimulus dimensions, which may allow participants who interact 
with stimuli a more potent benefit to category learning and concept formation. 
 That being said, the structure of the categories in the II task was designed such 
that interactivity would allow participants easy access to an interactive, unidimensional 
rule, rather than having to rely on a difficult to learn multidimensional visual rule. 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to have expected that participants with interactive access 
should have learned to categorize at similar rates when engaged in either the II or RB 
tasks. However, when considering just those participants with interactive instructions, 
participants engaged in the RB task made their first significant improvement an entire 
block sooner (M=1.743) than participants engaged in the II task (M=2.743). While this 
difference is too large to claim that participants in the two groups made significant 
improvements in categorization accuracy with similar amounts of experience, it should be 
noted that, participants who were given different instructions, showed larger differences 
in learning between task types (RB vs II). For participants with A or B instructions, 
participants engaged in the RB task made their first significant improvement in accuracy 
nearly two blocks sooner (M= 1.829) than participants engaged in the II task (M=3.400) 
and similar effects are found when considering participants with Kids Toys instructions 
(M=1.686 vs M=4.114) and with imagined interaction instructions (M= 1.286 vs 
M=3.657). We can, thereby, say with some small amount of confidence that participants 
who actually interacted with the stimuli were able to access the unidimensional rule of 
torque when engaged in the II task, making the learning of category structure easier. 
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Instructions and Interactions 
The qualitative self-report of participants also supports this claim. Among those 
participants who engaged in the II task, many who received interactive instructions 
reported categorizing stimuli according to some measure of torque or weight; they used 
the difficulty they experienced when manipulating the stimuli in their judgments of 
category membership, rather than visual information. In contrast, very few participants, 
even among those who were instructed to imagine picking up the objects, made similar 
reports. They instead often offered overall object size (e.g. B’s are bigger than A’s) as an 
explanation for their categorization decisions. It should be noted that there were some 
participants who engaged in the II task who also reported using stimulus “weight” in their 
judgments outside of the interaction instruction group. However, these cases were much 
less frequent. 
Perhaps surprising, instructions seemed to impact the self-reported explanations 
for categorization behavior for participants in the RB task as well. Several participants in 
both the imagined and actual interaction instruction groups reported using an interactive 
categorization rule of “difficulty to pick up”. In this paradigm, stimuli in category B (the 
thinner category in the RB task) were perceived as more difficult for participants to pick 
up due to an insufficient distance between the handle and the table for the participants’ 
thumbs to fit under to allow for lifting the block. Again, just as with the reports from the  
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II task, this effect was not universal, with many participants in both the imagined and 
actual interaction instruction groups reporting using the visual rule of stimulus width to 
determine a stimulus’ category membership. 
This illuminates what is likely the aspect which most cripples the formation of 
any bold conclusions for the current experiment: for those participants engaging in the II 
task, the unidimensional, interactive rule was not universally perceived and learned by 
participants who could physically interact with the stimuli. This is an important factor in 
establishing the context of current marginal results. It suggests a significant difference 
between the perception of the stimuli from the current experiment and the perceptions of 
stimuli such as stairs (Warren, 1984) or passable gaps such as doorways (Warren & 
Whang, 1986). One of the critical differences between these examples and the present 
experiment was that the categories in the present experiment are defined by an interactive 
definition which delimitates a level of difficulty, rather than the boundary between 
possible and impossible action. This represents a qualitative distinction between the 
present experiment and previous experiments regarding the immediately perceived 
affordances or non-affordances of the environment. 
The nature of affordances is that they are immediately perceived aspects of the 
environment based not only on the dimensions of the environment but also upon the 
capacity of the agent perceiving them to interact with them (Gibson, 1979). In essence, 
affordances are binary dimensions: they either exist or do not. A surface is either 
considered stable, solid, and angled properly so that it can be traversed, or it is not, and 
this is immediately perceived by the agent, guiding its action. If cognition is to be 
grounded by way of these affordances, such as in the example of the chair, it may be 
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difficult for such a system of perception and action to deal with complex category 
boundaries which are not interactive absolutes; the “ease of action” is not as easily 
perceived as the “capacity for action”.  
Yet, while it is a reasonable explanation that the weak effects expressed in the 
current experiment are due to this distinction between ease of action and capacity for 
action, it forgoes the fact that we are capable of understanding that certain tasks are easier 
than others. It is easier to hit a thrown ball with a bat if the ball is traveling at 25 miles 
per hour than if it were traveling at 95, yet the capacity for both actions exist. We are just 
as capable of sitting down on a tree stump which is 3 feet wide as a tree stump 1 foot 
wide, although we understand that one is easier to balance on than the other (as well as 
being more comfortable). In essence, it is possible that complex stimuli and environments 
may be definable by unidimensional, interactive rules, some of which are absolute while 
others are relative. However, it is a safe assumption that we learn and utilize absolute 
boundaries, such as the capacity for action, differently than relative boundaries, such as 
ease of action. Whether this is a function of perceptual input or feedback is at this time 
unclear. However, given the findings of Tanaka and Taylor (1991), these boundaries, 
even absolute boundaries, may only become clear with extensive experience. 
The Bigger Picture 
Taken in whole, the results of this experiment indicate important aspects 
regarding the relationship between stimulus interactivity and categories and concepts by 
which we define those stimuli. First, given that instructions had differential impacts on 
participants’ category learning as a result of category structure, it is concluded that 
stimulus interactivity has a strong connection to categorization behavior when categories 
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and concepts are intimately tied to interactive capacities between the stimulus and the 
agent. However, when dealing with category structures which are not well defined by 
interactivity (such as the RB task in the present experiment) or instances in which 
interactivity is not explicitly used in the construction of categories, interactivity is not 
related to concept formation or use.  
While it tempting to derive conclusions on the strength of the various embodied 
cognition theories given the present results, such a step would not be wise at this time. 
The current results do show that individuals are more likely to incorporate interactivity 
into their category definitions when they are allowed to actually interact with the stimuli. 
However, this does not necessarily eliminate the viability of disembodied cognitive 
explanations. The interactive category rule in the II task is unidimensional, and should, 
therefore, be dominant (Ashby, Queller, & Berretty, 1999). As such, rather than 
considering the finding that some participants with interactive instructions utilized the 
interactive rule to be a surprising result, it could actually be considered odd that 
participants with interactive instructions did not utilize the simpler rule more reliably. We 
must also consider the knowledge that a great deal of support for embodied theories of 
cognition rely on tasks using imagined interactivity, such as the imagined grasping of 
objects (Frak, Paulignan, & Jeannerod, 2001). In the present experiment, however, 
participants who imagined lifting and wielding these objects in the present experiment 
showed no to little benefit to categorization accuracy in the II task, compared to 
participants who actually interacted with the objects.  This is more a curiosity than a 
strong test of embodiment and indeed the sum of these findings do not allow for a strong 
confirmation or disconfirmation of embodied theories of concept learning and use, 
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allowing only the conclusion that stimulus interactivity may be used in concept learning 
in instances where interactivity is not only active, as opposed to imagined, but also 
uniquely informative (II task). 
However, determining graspability is innately tied to physical interaction while 
mere identification does not necessarily require interactivity. Therefore, it is possible that 
imagined interaction may yet yield results similar to actual interaction when it comes to 
affecting category learning, but this may be limited to instances in which the goal of the 
interaction with a stimulus is more than identification. For example, one of the vital 
points for learning the differences between chairs and tables, which share a great deal of 
important characteristics both physical (solid, sturdy, above ground level, etc.) and 
interactive (e.g., a surface to support weight that also allows objects placed on it to 
remain in place), is that they are used to support different objects; namely that chairs are 
meant to support people while tables are meant to support objects. Individuals may, 
therefore, benefit from using imagined interactions when learning to differentiate 
between these two concepts. In fewer words, imagined and actual interactions may show 
similar effects on concept formation when concepts are defined by an interactive goal 
which depends upon a dimensional rule rather than when the concept is defined by the 
dimensional rule alone. 
If the goal or intent of interaction is vital to concept formation, then the impact of 
interactivity on concept formation may well be found within such interactive concepts 
such as hammers, stairs, and chairs. However, it is still unclear if interaction, with or 
without intention or goals, will have any impact on the learning of more abstract concepts 
such as “beauty” or “justice”. While it may be the case that interactivity is the progenitor 
  40 
of many concepts and categories, it may be just as difficult to define the specific 
interactive origins of such abstract concepts as it is to confine those defining interactions 
to a specific intention. The concept of justice, for example, may be invoked by many 
potential interactions. A thief may be imprisoned, fined, have his hand cut off, or even be 
forced to apologize and return the stolen goods. These interactions are unique, and so are 
their intentions: some are meant to be deterrents, some are meant to isolate, and some are 
meant to recompense those injured. While there are likely significant differences in how 
an individual defines justice, each of these instances can be said to be representative of 
the concept of justice for that individual. As such, it may be that the diversity of both the 
defining interaction and intentions may limit the impact of interactivity on the use of such 
abstract, diverse concepts despite the possibility that interactivity is essential for the 
learning and formation those same abstract concepts,  
Future Directions 
 The results of the present experiment present several opportunities for future 
research. The first aims to improve upon the construction of the present experiment 
through some minor alterations. As previously stated, it is likely the effects witnessed in 
the present experiment may have been tempered due to the categories’ interactive rule 
being defined by ease of action, rather than absolute capacity. Ideal future learning tasks 
could perhaps increase the beneficial effects found in the present experiment by having 
the rule come closer to these more absolute rules. Of course, these interactive rules are 
subject to the interactive capacities of the individual (Gibson, 1979; Warren, 1984; 
Warren & Whang, 1986), so establishing the rule for “capacity to interact” will be subject 
to alterations between participants. There is also the possibility that merely coming close 
  41 
to this capacity to interact will improve learning. Say, for instance, that a future 
experiment, utilizing similar stimuli establishes category B as being heavier than category 
A by virtue of a multidimensional rule just as in the present experiment. However, unlike 
the present experiment, several members of category B should be nearly impossible to 
lift/manipulate. Perhaps access to absolute interactivity would increase the likelihood of 
participants utilizing the interactive rule, thereby avoiding the difficulties inherent in the 
II task. 
 Next, there exists the possibility that conceptual grounding may aide in the 
transfer of rule information to new experiences. Casale, Roeder, and Ashby (2012) 
looked at the capacity of participants to extend a learned linear categorization rule, either 
unidimensional (RB task) or multidimensional (II), to new stimuli with dimensions which 
placed them close, in psychological space, to that same rule (see Figure 8). They found 
that participants were much more successful transferring the rule to new stimuli in the RB 
task compared to the II task. They argued that such “analogical” transfer is difficult for 
rules learned in the II task because such learning is dependent upon knowledge of unique 
perceptual combinations rather than an attention based assessment of a single dimension 
(Maddox & Filoteo, 2001). Here, again, the possibility of conceptual grounding offers a 
potential, beneficial effect. If interactivity allows for participants to express 
multidimensional, vision-based categorization rules in terms of a unidimensional, 
interactivity-based rule, then it is likely that interactivity may allow participants to 
transfer a supposedly II rule as if it were a RB rule. The potential benefit of allowing 
individuals to easily transfer supposedly complex distinctions to new stimuli with relative 
ease represents a huge potential benefit which should not be ignored. 
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 *Note.  This figure has been adapted from “Analogical transfer in perceptual categorization.” By Casale, 
M., Roeder, J., & Ashby, F. (2012), Memory and Cognition, 40, 434-449. Copyright 2012 by the American 
Psychological Association. 
Figure 8. Analogical Transfer in II and RB tasks  
 There also remains the possibility that the reason interactive instructions lacked 
any strong effect in the present experiment was due to the task: participants were learning 
to identify objects rather than on how to interact with them. This task demand may have 
caused participants to attend more to visual dimensions of stimulus (length and width) 
and less upon the interactive dimensions (weight/wieldability) of the stimuli. As such, it 
may be possible that participants with actual or imagined interactions may be more likely 
to use interactivity in their categorization of stimuli if their learning of categories was 
defined by the learning of an interactive goal. To illustrate, let us consider the possibility 
of teaching a young child the difference between a hammer and a wrench. To an adult, 
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this difference may be intuitive, yet to a child who is first experiencing these objects, 
their visual similarities (e.g., thinner on one end, weighted on one end, metallic, etc.) may 
lend themselves to confusability. Even early interactions may not necessarily allow for 
distinction as simply lifting and wielding the objects will not necessarily illuminate their 
unique functions. It is when each tool is paired with its interactive partner, the hammer 
with a nail and a wrench with a bolt, that the tools are easily distinguishable. To test this 
possibility in a future experiment, participants could learn to sort the same stimuli as the 
present experiment into two groups, however, in interacting with the objects they would 
be asked to use the stimuli to hammer small pegs into a board. In such a setup, those 
stimuli with more “weight” would be better “hammers” in essence allowing the same 
interactive rule to imply an interactive use to the object rather than an interactive rule left 
unrelated to object use.  
Finally, there remains the grand, yet distant outcome of utilizing grounded 
cognition to aide in the learning and instruction of complex, and potentially abstract 
concepts. It has been theorized that abstract concepts, such as mathematics, are embodied 
concepts; grounded to our capacity to interact with the world (Nuñez, 2000).  A strong 
piece of evidence said to support this claim has been the findings that instructors 
frequently utilize gesture in their explanations and descriptions of a variety of rules in 
mathematics and physics. Indeed, children taking a test covering a mathematical principle 
performed better when given prior instructions which included instructional pointing than 
when given instructions without pointing (Valenzeno, Alibali, & Klatsky, 2003). 
However, this type of research is the exception rather than the rule regarding the potential 
influence of conceptual grounding to the learning of complex information. A large 
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portion of the research on this topic has focused on describing the actions of teachers 
attempting to explain this material to students, with little concern for its efficacy (see 
Alibali & Nathan, 2012 for a summary). Additional research, akin to that of the present 
experiment as well as the work of Valenzeno et al. (2003) should seek to offer greater 
insight into the potential impact of conceptual grounding to the learning of complex 
concepts by controlling the types of instructions students receive, rather than by simply 
observing it. 
Conclusions  
 Grounded cognition offers a potentially beneficial and easily accessible method to 
aide in the learning of complex concepts by simplifying them to a more immediately 
available relationship between the individual and the environment. This possibility has 
important implications in potentially understanding how we learn complex rules and 
offers potential learning aides, so investigating it further is worthwhile. While the current 
results allow for some small confidence in the capacity of conceptual ground and 
stimulus interactivity to aide in learning, there remains much work to be done to flesh out 
the extent and limitations of this strategy. 
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APPENDIX A  
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO PARTICIPANTS 
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To all participants: 
 “Thank you for your participation. If at any time you feel as though you cannot 
continue, you may stop the experiment at no penalty. Your task today will be to learn 
how to sort a series of objects into two distinct groups. You have never seen or interacted 
with these objects before so, at the beginning of the experiment you will have no idea as 
to which group an object belongs to, but you will learn, and here’s how: I will take these 
objects one at a time and place them on the table in front of you.” 
Then the instructions diverge 
A or B: 
 “You will then look at, but not touch, the object and then make your best guess as 
to whether it is an “A” or “B”. “ 
 
Kids Toys: 
 “The objects are simplistic children’s toys made out of wood. You will look at, 
but not touch these toys, and make your best guess as to whether it is a “Type A” or 
“Type B” toy.” 
 
Imagined Interactions: 
 “You will look at each object and imagine picking it up with your right hand on 
the right side of the object. Imagine manipulating the object: waving it around, swinging 
it, etc.  I only ask that you don’t imagine rotating the object so that you could see the 
opposite side. After imagining interacting with the object, make your best guess as to 
whether the object is an “A” or “B”.” 
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 Actual Interactions: 
 “You will look at each object and the pick it up by the right side with your right 
hand. Feel free to manipulate the object: waving it around, swinging it, etc. I only ask that 
you don’t rotate the object so that you could see the opposite side. After imagining 
interacting with the object, make your best guess as to whether the object is an “A” or 
“B”.”  
Then the instructions converge 
 “After you have made your judgment, I will tell you if you are correct or 
incorrect. Then I will take the object behind the curtain and replace it with another. And 
the process will repeat. After going through each object once, we will repeat the process 
again, going through each object randomly. We will go through a total of 6 rounds. At the 
beginning of this experience, you will be simply guessing, but as we go through more and 
more stimuli, you will get better. Do you have any questions?”  
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APPENDIX B 
BAYESIAN MODEL PRIORS 
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N = 20 
τ1 ~ dgamma (ατ1, βτ1) 
ατ1 = 1 
βτ1 =1 
τ2 ~ dgamma (ατ2, βτ2) 
ατ2 = 1 
βτ2 =1 
Tk ~ dbeta(αk, βk) 
All α = 2 
All β1 = 2 
All β2 = 3 
All β3 = 4 
All β4 = 5 
All β5 = 6 
All β6 = 7  
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APPENDIX C  
BAYESIAN MODELS 
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AGSL Model 
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AGDL Model 
A or B      Kids Toys 
 
Imagine     Interactive 
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IGDL Model 
Non-Interactive     Interactive 
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